The Future of Marriage in America

http://marriage. rutgers. edu/Publications/SOOU/TEXTSOOU2007. htm The State of Our Unions The Social Health of Marriage in America 2007 Essay: The Future of Marriage in America David Popenoe  © Copyright 2007 Introduction In this year’s essay, David Popenoe argues that long-term trends point to the gradual weakening of marriage as the primary social institution of family life. More Americans today are living together, marrying at older ages or not at all, and rearing children in cohabiting or solo parent households. Overall, the U. S. trends are following the far-advanced trends toward nonmarriage in Northwestern European nations, albeit at a slower and more uneven pace. Popenoe attributes the weakening of marriage to a broad cultural shift away from religion and social traditionalism and toward faith in personal independence and tolerance for diverse life styles – otherwise known as â€Å"secular individualism. † This cultural shift is a central feature of modern societies and therefore unlikely to be reversed. Compared to Europeans, moreover, Americans are more libertarian and thus may be more susceptible to harshly negative consequences of secular individualism on family life. As Popenoe concludes, it will probably require a cultural awakening, perhaps prompted by rational self-interest, to avoid such an outcome. We will have to adopt the view that personal happiness depends on high-trust and lasting relationships and that such relationships require constraints on short-term adult interests in order to foster long-term commitments to children, and thus to the future. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA David Popenoe Almost a decade ago, in our first annual State of Our Unions Report in 1999, the lead essay was â€Å"What’s Happening to Marriage. † The picture we painted was hopeful, if not especially optimistic. Marriage, we reported, â€Å"is weakening but it is too soon to write its obituary. † In this, our ninth annual report to the nation, I want to summarize what has been happening to marriage in recent years and peer into the future. One question in particular is compelling: Is marriage in America headed in the direction of the European nations, where it is an even weaker social institution than in the United States? Or are we, as in other areas of our national life—such as our higher level of religious participation and belief—the great exception to the seemingly entrenched trends of the developed, Western societies? This raises, in turn, another intriguing question: Is America still a single nation in family terms, or are we becoming more divided by region and class? Marriage and Family Trends of the Past Decade There can be no doubt that the institution of marriage has continued to weaken in recent years. Whereas marriage was once the dominant and single acceptable form of living arrangement for couples and children, it is no longer. Today, there is more â€Å"family diversity:† Fewer adults are married, more are divorced or remaining single, and more are living together outside of marriage or living alone. [The most recent data are available in the second half of this report. Today, more children are born out-of-wedlock (now almost four out of ten), and more are living in stepfamilies, with cohabiting but unmarried adults, or with a single parent. This means that more children each year are not living in families that include their own married, biological parents, which by all available empirical evidence is the gold standard for insuring optimal outcomes in a child’s development. In the late 1990s quite a bit was written about a â€Å"marriage and family turnaround,† or a reversal of the many family weakening trends. Most negative family trends have slowed appreciably in recent years; they have not continued in the dramatically swift trajectory upward that prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s. Much of this may be due simply to the slowing of social trends as they â€Å"mature. † The only major family trend that has actually reversed direction is divorce. After rising steeply, beginning around 1965, the divorce rate has dropped gradually since the early 1980s, apparently mainly the result of adults becoming better educated and marrying at a later age. Other possible reasons for the decreasing divorce rate are the rise of non-marital cohabitation and a decline in second and subsequent marriages. Divorcees, for example, have become more likely to cohabit rather than remarry, thus avoiding remarriages that have always had a disproportionately high risk of divorce. The Marriage Gap One surprising development of recent years is the growth of a marriage and divorce â€Å"gap† between differently educated segments of the population. People who have completed college (around a quarter of the population) tend to have significantly higher marriage and lower divorce rates compared to those with less education. Among those married in the early 1990s, for example, only 16. 5 percent of college educated women were divorced within ten years, compared to 46 percent for high school dropouts. Indeed, most of the recent divorce rate decline has been among the college educated; for those with less than a high school education, the divorce rate actually has been rising. 1) The weakening of marriage and the resultant growth of family diversity thus is found much more prominently among those with less education and associated lower incomes. The underlying reason for this may be as simple as the fact that the personality and social characteristics enabling one to complete college are similar to those that foster today’s long-term marriages. Or, that delayed entry into the adult world of work and childbearing, and the incr ease in income and knowledge that college typically fosters, better allows mature values and financial security to undergird choice of partner and family life. Whatever the reasons, this marriage and divorce gap has been a major contributor to the growing economic inequality in America. Some expect the marriage gap to grow larger in the future because children tend to follow the family behavior of their parents. Children of the educated and financially comfortable are better socialized to marry successfully and to contain childbearing within marriage, whereas children of the lower classes often do not have this advantage. But it is doubtful that this gap will have much effect on the over-all drift of marriage in America. The increase in the college-educated portion of the population has been slowing appreciably. And the fertility of college-educated women has dropped. Twenty-four percent of college-educated women aged 40-44 were childless in 2004, compared to only 15 percent of women that age who didn’t finish high school. (2) On a national scale, the continuation of this fertility discrepancy could seriously counteract any beneficial family effects of higher education. The European Direction No matter how weak it has become, however, compared to other modern nations marriage remains at the center of American life. About 85 percent of Americans are expected to marry sometime in their lives, compared to less than 70 percent in a number of European nations. Only ten percent of Americans in an international survey agreed that â€Å"marriage is an out-dated institution,† compared to 26 percent in the UK and 36 percent in France. (3) Only about ten percent of American couples are cohabiting outside of marriage, compared to almost one third in Sweden. And our commercial wedding industry certainly has become huge. Yet an overriding question is whether marriage and family trends in every modern society are headed in a common direction. In other words, is there a set of family trends endemic to modern (urban, industrial, democratic, and still mostly Western) societies that supercedes economic, cultural, and even religious differences among regions and nations? If so, the current family system in the United States is not an exception but merely a laggard; we will gradually be swept up in the tide. Up to now, the pacesetters in most contemporary marriage and family trends—all moving in the direction of a non-marriage culture—have been the nations of Northwestern Europe, especially the Nordic countries. They have the latest age at first marriage, the lowest marriage and highest non-marital cohabitation rates, and the largest number of out-of-wedlock births. The nations in Southern Europe such as Spain, Italy and Greece, with less cohabitation and fewer out-of-wedlock births, tend to look more like the United States. Family traditionalism remains stronger in these southern nations, and young people live longer in their childhood homes, often until they marry, rather than living independently or in cohabiting unions. The United Kingdom and the Anglo-settler nations, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, typically stand somewhere in between the two extremes. But with respect to each of the dominant family trends of recent decades the other modern nations have been moving, albeit at varying speeds and not without some temporary lapses, in the Northwest European direction. The percentage of people getting married has been going down, the number of people cohabiting outside of marriage has been increasing, and the out-of-wedlock birth percentage has been skyrocketing. Between the early to mid 1990s and the early 2000s, for example, the marriage rate dropped twelve percent in Italy, 14 percent in Spain, 22 percent in Canada, 28 percent in New Zealand and 24 percent in the United States. At the same time, the non-marital cohabitation percentage (of all couples) climbed 23 percent in Italy and Australia, 53 percent in the United Kingdom, and 49 percent in the United States. The nonmarital birth rate jumped 24 percent in the United States, 48 percent in the United Kingdom, 96 percent in Italy, and a whopping 144 percent in Spain. 4) In one major respect the United States has long been the pacesetter and not the laggard. For generations, we have had the highest divorce rate. Yet even this is now changing. The U. S. rate has been dropping for several decades, while the divorce rate in many European nations has stayed the same or been climbing. The number of divorces per one thousand married women in the United Kingdom in 2002 was 14. 4, not too far from the United States rate of 18. 4. In the past, the incidence of family breakup was closely aligned with the incidence of divorce, but this is no longer the case. Because more people now cohabit in place of marrying, when a cohabiting couple breaks up it is not registered as a divorce would be. Unfortunately, we have no standard reporting system for the breakup of cohabiting couples, but all empirical studies show that cohabiting couples breakup at a much higher rate than married couples. While only ten percent of American couples cohabit, some 20 percent of British couples do. So if we are considering total family breakup, it is likely the case that Britain plus a number of other European nations now surpass us. There is one other important respect in which America has been in the vanguard of family trends—we have the highest percentage of mother-only families. Many European nations have a much higher percentage of out-of-wedlock births than we do, but the great majority of these births are to unmarried but cohabiting couples. In America, much more often, children are born to a lone mother with the father not in residence and often out of the child’s life. Nearly half of all extramarital births in America were of this nature in 2001, according to the latest available data. 5) One reason is our relatively high percentage of births to teenagers, 80 percent of which are non-marital and more than half of those to lone mothers; another is that 70 percent of all unwed births to African Americans are to lone mothers. However, the gap in mother-only families between the United States and other nations of the West is also in the process of diminishing. Being born to a lone mother is onl y one route to living in a mother-only family. Another route is through the break-up of parents after the child is born, which is far more common among parents who cohabit compared to those who marry. With parental break-up rates in other nations climbing rapidly, thanks largely to increased non-marital cohabitation, many of these nations are catching up with us in the alarming statistic of mother-only families. Even by the early 1990s, according to the calculations of several scholars, New Zealand had caught up with the United States with nearly 50 percent of children expected to experience single parenting by age 15, and the figure for Canada and five European countries exceeded 33 percent. (6) These percentages would probably be much higher if they were recalculated today using more recent data. So if we are moving in the direction of the more negative family trends of other modern nations, and they are moving in the direction of our negative trends, where does this leave us? Aren’t we all in a common basket, destined to witness an institution of marriage that is ever weakening? Before considering this, let us first have a look at the possibility that America is becoming increasingly bifurcated into two distinct cultures. Could it be that only one part of America is moving in a European family direction? The American Red-Blue Divide The recent family trends in the Western nations have been largely generated by a distinctive set of cultural values that scholars have come to label â€Å"secular individualism. † It features the gradual abandonment of religious attendance and beliefs, a strong leaning toward â€Å"expressive† values that are preoccupied with personal autonomy and self-fulfillment, and a political emphasis on egalitarianism and the tolerance of diverse lifestyles. An established empirical generalization is that the greater the dominance of secular individualism in a culture, the more fragmented the families. The fundamental reason is that the traditional nuclear family is a somewhat inegalitarian group (not only between husbands and wives but also parents and children) that requires the suppression of some individuality and also has been strongly supported by, and governed by the rules of, orthodox religions. As a seeming impediment to personal autonomy and social equality, therefore, the traditional family is an especially attractive unit for attacks from a secular individualistic perspective. On average, America has been moving in the direction of secular individualism, as can be seen in the general drift of our family trends. But the â€Å"on average† covers up some very substantial variations, some of which account for why, looked at internationally, we are a nation with relatively conservative family values. A recent National Cultural Values Survey (7) found that American adults usefully can be split into three groups, based on the degree to which they have embraced secular individualism, ranging from the Orthodox to the Progressives, with Independents in the middle. The survey found 31 percent of the population in the religiously Orthodox category, 17 percent in the secular Progressive category, and 46 percent as Independents. The Orthodox category is far larger than one finds in Western Europe and the other Anglo nations, and the Progressive category (i. e. , secular individualist) is considerably smaller, and therein lies the major basis for American family exceptionalism. One thing that makes these categories so prominent in American culture is that they are strongly expressed geographically. As analyzed by demographers at the University of Michigan, the two extremes are reflected in the so-called Red (Republican) and Blue (Democratic) state distinction frequently made in recent national political analysis. 8) The more Progressive Blue states are principally those of the Northeast, the Upper Midwest, and the West Coast, while the more Orthodox Red states are found in the South, the lower Midwest, and the Mountain region of the West. Reflecting their different ideologies, the Blue states tend to have lower marriage and higher cohabitation rates, along with lower fertility, while the Red states are more t raditional in their family structure. [See box in the second half of this report. The ideology and family behavior found in the Blue states resembles that of the other Western nations, although not quite as far down the path of Progressivism. If one were referring only to this part of America, one would not be talking about American exceptionalism. The large Orthodox population of the Red states, however, does give the United States a unique configuration in the modern world. If it were not for this population, we would not be having a â€Å"culture war† and we probably would not even be having a national conversation about the weakening of marriage. There is no such conversation about marriage in the Northwestern European nations, despite the fact that the institution of marriage is considerably weaker there than it is here. It is clear that the family structure of America is exceptional in some respects. The question is, are we so exceptional that we can resist the modern trend of marriage and family decline? So far the answer is no—we have been headed down the same path as every other modern, Western society toward ever-increasing secular individualism with its associated family structures. If this trend continues, the family structure of the Red states will come to look more and more like today’s Blue states, and the Blue states will look ever more like Europe. The Prospect for Cultural Change To reverse this trend of marriage and family decline would take a cultural transformation of some kind, and it is interesting to consider and evaluate what this might look like, and what could bring it about. One potential source of change would be a significant expansion in influence and authority of today’s orthodox, anti-individualist religions. Much has been written in recent years about the weakening of secularization, pointing out that modernization no longer necessarily means the demise of religion. The evidence for this comes from the newly modernizing countries of the world, however, where orthodox religions have actually been gaining, rather than losing, strength. There is no evidence that anything like this has been happening to date in the Western European and Anglo nations. Quite the opposite; with each passing year these nations—including the United States—are more secular than ever before. The National Cultural Values Survey noted above found that regular churchgoing has dipped below 50 percent and only 36 percent believe â€Å"people should live by God’s principles,† concluding that â€Å"America no longer enjoys cultural consensus on God, religion, and what constitutes right and wrong. â€Å"(9) A powerful indicator of future trends are the beliefs and attitudes of today’s young people, which are unmistakably more secular and individualist than those of their elders. A recent study concluded that emerging adults (ages 18-24) in America, compared to their earlier counterparts and their older contemporaries, are more disaffected and disconnected from society, more cynical or negative about people, and have moved in a liberal direction. (10) A Pew Foundation national survey found that 20 percent of today’s young people (18-24) say they have no religious affiliation or are atheist or agnostic, nearly double the percentage of the non-religious found in that age group less than 20 years ago. In the same time period the percentage of young people who did not agree that they had â€Å"old fashioned values about family and marriage† jumped from 17 percent to 31 percent. (11) A study in Britain, starkly pointing up the entrenched nature of this generational shift, found that a child with two religious parents has only a 50 percent chance of being religious, while a child with one religious parent has 25 percent chance of being religious. 12) Another cultural transformation that could move the family in a more traditional direction is widespread immigration. In combination with low birthrates, massive immigration is capable of changing the culture, social experiences, and self-identity of a population—including the ideologies of secularism and individualism. This possibility is beginning to be discussed in Europe, where birthrates in many nations remain well below replacement level and immigration, mostly from orthodox Muslim countries with high birthrates, is h igh and growing. The percentage of foreign born in many Western European nations is now similar to that in America, around twelve percent, but the birthrates of these groups are typically far higher than the indigenous populations. Projections are that the percentage of people of â€Å"foreign origin† may reach as high as one third in some European nations by 2050, and far higher than that in the major cities. (13) What is not known is how these new immigrants ultimately will react to secular individualism and the other cultural beliefs and practices of modern, Western democracies. As many have noted, because of long-standing antipathies between peoples of the Muslim faith and those of Christianity, often violent and going back well more than a millennium, it does seem possible that Europe faces the prospect of a major cultural transformation sometime in the future through immigrants who, rather than assimilate, will pull the culture in a new direction. The immigration situation in the United States, however, is different, and it does not seem as likely that in the foreseeable future immigrant groups will be able to seriously shift our culture in a more traditional direction. The most likely candidate for cultural change, of course, is the growing Hispanic population. The percentage of Hispanics is projected to reach 25 percent of the total population by 2050, when non-Hispanic Whites will make up only a slim majority. (14) But unlike Europe we are already a nation made up of many different immigrant groups; many Hispanics have been here for years, and they share a common religious heritage in Christianity. Thus Hispanics don’t pose the same threat of not assimilating to Western culture as do the Muslims. Indeed, to date, Hispanics seem to have assimilated into the American culture of secular individualism more than the reverse. For example, the unwed birth percentage among Hispanics has jumped from 19 percent in 1980 to 48 percent in 2005 and stands well above the percentage for the non-Hispanic White population (25 percent). Hispanics have the same divorce rate as non-Hispanic Whites, and in recent years their rate of non-marital cohabitation has grown faster than that of any other immigrant group. These trends contradict earlier expectations that Hispanics might bring this nation a new wave of family traditionalism. The prediction of the continued growth of secular individualism within modern cultures rests on some powerful facts. So far in the Western experience, at least, the dominant sociological factors associated with secular individualism are that the higher the educational and income levels of a population, and the more urbanized it is, the greater the degree of secular individualism. Is it likely that any time in the near future educational, income, and urbanization levels in America will drop? They have been increasing inexorably for three centuries, so a turnaround would most likely occur only in the event of some catastrophe, either natural or man-made. Absent such a catastrophe (which certainly can not be ruled out in today’s world), the most likely future scenario is that secular individualism will increasingly dominate the cultures of the West. The best prospects for cultural change, therefore, rest on the possibility that, at some time in the future, new generations of secular individualists themselves will undergo a change of heart. One way this might occur is through the growth of new, non-orthodox religious ideologies that remained compatible with secular individualism but take it in new directions. Unfortunately, the new religious strains that have emerged in recent decades, so-called New Age religions, have been profoundly individualistic. None has shown any interest in preserving marriage and family solidarity. Indeed, they seem part and parcel of the secular individualist movement, albeit with a more â€Å"spiritual† bent. The same seems to hold true for today’s rapidly growing â€Å"green† movement, which itself shows signs of becoming a new quasi-religion in which the environment has replaced God as a focus of almost divine adoration. So far there is little evidence that â€Å"pro-green† translates into â€Å"pro-marriage† or â€Å"pro-family,† although it is conceivable that somehow the conservation of nature could become translated into the conservation of the family. Any widely accepted â€Å"new morality† that might change family behavior would probably have to be compatible with secular individualism’s motivating force—rational self-interest. The self-interest of today’s young people still includes the desire to have strong intimate relationships and to want to do best by their children. And there is every reason to believe that these interests will continue into the future because they are, in fact, an intrinsic part of being human. The task that lies ahead, then, is to help young people to see the importance of marriage and strong families as the best way to achieve these interests; to help them realize that a better and more meaningful way of life, both for themselves and for their children, involves a commitment to long-term marriage. What Can be Done? As a first step, the institution of marriage needs to be promoted by all levels of society, particularly the families, the schools, the churches, the non-profit sector, and the government. The great majority of American high school seniors still want to get married, with 82 percent of girls and 70 percent of boys recently saying that â€Å"having a good marriage and family life† is â€Å"extremely important† to them. These percentages, in fact, represent a slight increase from the late 1970s. 15) But as high schoolers reach young adulthood, when the attraction of cohabitation and careers gains strong currency, making the actual commitment to marriage is not easy. Young people need, therefore, to be made continually aware of the many benefits married life brings, both for themselves and for their children. The empirical evidence is now strong and persuasive that a good marriage enhances personal happiness, economic success, health and longevity. This ev idence should become a regular part of our educational programs and our public discourse. Yet successful marriage promotion requires more than empirical evidence. Marriage has fallen by the wayside, in part, because it receives less and less social recognition and approval. Any norm of behavior requires for its maintenance the continuing support of the community, including active social pressures to uphold it. When social approval and pressures wither, the norm weakens. Today’s young people have been taught through the schools and in their communities a strong message of tolerance for â€Å"alternative lifestyles. † â€Å"Thou shalt not make moral judgments about other people’s family behavior† seems to have become a dominant message in our times. The reason for this is completely understandable; children and young people come from ever more diverse family situations which are not of their own doing, and they should be fully accepted and not be penalized. The problem is that this moral message is carried on into adult life, where it is applied not to children and young people but to adults who do have choices about how they shape their lives. In an effort not to judge much less stigmatize any adult life style, we have all too often become virtually silent about the value and importance of marriage. This silence is extremely damaging to the promotion of a pro-marriage culture. The widespread promotion of marriage is directed at only half of the problem, however. Getting people to marry is one thing, helping them to stay married is something else entirely. Helping people to stay married is the main focus of an important set of programs known as marriage education. Typically conducted in group settings rather than counseling situations, marriage education programs focus on developing the knowledge, attitudes and skills needed for making a wise marital choice and having a successful marriage. Although marriage education has been around for many decades, it recently has been thrust into the limelight thanks to widespread publicity and government financial assistance. The importance of marriage education is magnified by the fact that the marital relationship today is so different from what it was in the past. Marriage is now based almost entirely on close friendship and romantic love, mostly stripped of the economic dependencies, legal and religious restrictions, and extended family pressures that have held marriages together for most of human history. Until fairly recent times marriages had little to do with romantic love, sexual passion, or even close friendship; they were functional partnerships in the intense struggle of life. Today, a successful marriage rests almost entirely on how well one gets along, intimately and for the long term, with someone of the opposite sex. The â€Å"relationship knowledge† this requires has never been part of formal education, but there is no reason to believe that it can not effectively be taught to married couples and those about to be married, as well as to younger people as part of the high school curriculum. Indeed, the initial empirical evaluations of marriage education programs conclude that they are both well-received and have generally positive outcomes. Marriage promotion and marriage education are essential steps, but in order fully to rebuild the institution of marriage there would probably have to be a cultural shift of a more fundamental nature. Modern cultures would need to pull back from the now dominant thrust of secular individualism—the excessive pursuit of personal autonomy, immediate gratification, and short-term personal gain—and give greater emphasis to issues of community and social solidarity. This could come about through a growing realization, based on rational self-interest, that our personal happiness and sense of well-being over the long course of life are less affected by the amount of independence, choice, bodily pleasure and wealth we are able to obtain than by the number of stable, long-term and meaningful relationships we have with others. (16) And through a greater recognition of the fact that short-term adult interests can be in conflict with the long-term health and wellbeing of children, and that our children’s welfare has everything to do with the future of our nation. Conclusion America is still the most marrying of Western nations, but nevertheless we are caught up in the prevailing trends of modernity that lead toward an ever-weakening institution of marriage. Marriage rates have been dropping and cohabitation and out-of-wedlock birth rates have been rising, thanks in large part to the growing influence of secular individualism in all modern cultures. The negative effects of this are felt most profoundly by our children, who are growing up in family situations that are less and less optimum from a child-development perspective. As we move in the direction of the weaker family structures of Europe it is important to remember that we lack many of the welfare â€Å"safety-nets† found there, and therefore the negative effects of marital decline on children are likely to be heightened in this country. We are not a unified nation in family terms. We have a marriage gap, whereby the college-educated have a stronger marriage culture than the less well-educated. And we have a Red state/Blue state divide, whereby the nation is geographically split up into areas of family traditionalism and non-traditionalism. Yet these divisions remain peripheral to the overall waning of marriage in America. The rebuilding of a stronger marriage culture is possible. In addition to the heavy promotion of marriage built around the self-interest of today’s young people, it will probably require a cultural shift of some magnitude, one in which stable, predictable, and long-term relationships with others come to be viewed as the best foundation for adult personalities, childrearing, and family life. Footnotes 1. Steven P. Martin, â€Å"Trends in Marital Dissolution by Women’s Education in the United States,† Demographic Research 15-20 (December 2006), 537-560. 2. Jane Lawler Dye, â€Å"Fertility of American Women: June 2004. † Current Population Report, P20-555, Washington, DC: US Census Bureau (2005),Table 7. 3. Reported in Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, â€Å"Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces,† unpublished manuscript, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (2007). 4. Unless otherwise indicated, all calculations are by the National Marriage Project from published international data sources. . Lisa Mincieli and Kristin Moore, â€Å"The Relationship Context of Births Outside of Marriage: The Rise of Cohabitation,† Child Trends Research Brief 2007-13 (May 2007). 6. Patrick Heuveline, J. M. Timberlake, and F. F. Furstenberg, Jr. , â€Å"Shifting Childrearing to Single Mothers: Results from 17 Western Countries,† Population and Devel opment Review 29-1 (March 2003), 47-71. 7. Culture and Media Institute, Alexandria, Virginia (2007). 8. Ron J. Lesthaeghe and Lisa Neidert, â€Å"The Second Demographic Transition in the U. S. : Exception or Textbook Example,† Population and Development Review December 2006), 32-4. 9. Executive Summary, op. cit. 10. Tom Smith, â€Å"Generation Gaps in Attitudes and Values from the 1970s to the 1990s,† in R. A. Settersten, Jr. , F. F. Furstenberg, Jr. , and R. C. Rumbaut (eds. ), On the Frontier of Adulthood: Theory, Research, and Public Policy (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2004). 11. The Pew Research Center, â€Å"A Portrait of Generation Next,† Washington, DC, 2007. 12. Alasdair Crockett and David Voas, â€Å"Generations of Decline: Religious Change in the 20th Century,† Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (December 2006), 45-4. 3. David Coleman, â€Å"Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition, † Population and Development Review 32-3 (September 2006), 401-446. 14. Philip Martin and Elizabeth Midgely, â€Å"Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America,† Population Bulletin 58-2 (June 2003), p. 22. 15. Data from Monitoring the Future surveys, reported in this second half of this report. 16. For an important statement about this, see John Ashcroft and Phil Caroe, â€Å"Thriving Lives: Which Way for Well-Being? † Relationships Foundation, Cambridge, England (2007). SOCIAL INDICATORS OF MARITAL HEALTH AND WELLBEING TRENDS OF THE PAST FOUR DECADES Marriage Divorce Unmarried Cohabitation Loss of Child Centeredness Fragile Families with Children Teen Attitudes About Marriage and Family THE RED/BLUE AMERICAN FAMILY DIVIDE The Red State/Blue State divide has become a familiar theme in national politics. In a series of recent presidential elections, the so-called Red states have tended to vote Republican and the Blue states have voted Democratic. The Red states consist of the South (e. g. Alabama), the lower Midwest (e. g. Oklahoma), and the Mountain Region of the West (e. g. Montana). The Blue states are those of the Northeast (e. g. Massachusetts), the upper Midwest (e. g. Minnesota), and the West Coast (e. g. California). Less well known is the fact that the Red and Blue states also differ significantly in family terms, and this may help to explain their politics. The Red states typically have a more traditional family structure than the Blue States; people in the Red states marry younger and in larger numbers, cohabit outside of marriage less, and have more children. This is in large part because Red Staters are likely to be more religiously observant and to belong to denominations that profess allegiance to more conservative social values. However, the Red states also have higher divorce and out-of-wedlock birth rates than the Blue states, and these rates can hardly be considered indicators of traditionalism, much less religiosity. A closer look at the actual demographic differences among the states can help us to better understand the nature and causes of the Red/Blue American family divide. Red states have significantly higher marriage rates. The national marriage rate was 41 marriages per 1000 single women in 2005. Some of the highest marriage rates are found in the South, with Arkansas (77) and Alabama (54) leading the pack, and in the Mountain states of Idaho (66), Wyoming (60) and Utah (58). The lowest marriage rates, in contrast, are found in the Northeast with Pennsylvania (24), New Jersey (27), Delaware (28) and Connecticut (28) at the bottom. a) Higher marriage rates are associated with less non-marital cohabitation, and this also clusters geographically along Red/Blue lines. The national rate of unmarried partner households (as percent of all couple households) was 10% in 2005. States in the South and Midwest have the lowest percentages: Alabama (6%), Mississippi (8%), Kansas (8%), and Arkansas (8%). At the opposite pole are the states in the Northeast and Northwest: Vermont (14%), Maine (13%), Oregon (12%) and Washington (12%). (b) Statewide fertility rates fo llow a similar Red/Blue geographic distribution. The national fertility rate was 67 births per 1000 women ages 15-44 in 2005, but it was in the 70s in a number of Red states, Idaho (77), Kansas (70), and Georgia (70), and only in the 50s for Vermont (51), Maine (54) and Massachusetts (56). In addition to family traditionalism, the fertility rate in a number of southwestern States is greatly affected by the higher-fertility Hispanic population. (c) Put all together, these demographic characteristics add up to more married couples with children in the Red states and fewer in the Blue states, and this is ne of the biggest reasons for the Red/Blue political divide. Married people with children have tended disproportionately in recent presidential elections to favor the Republican Party. Indeed, for recent elections the correlation between married-with-children and voting Republican is one of the highest ever found between demographic factors and voting behavior. (d) Yet the Red states also, interestingly, have the highest out-of-wedloc k birth percentages and divorce rates. While 37% of all births in the U. S. ere out-of-wedlock in 2005, the unwed birth percentages for the Red states of Mississippi (49%) and Louisiana (48%) are far ahead of the Blue states of New Hampshire (27%) and Minnesota (30%) A closer examination, however, shows that this Red/Blue geographic pattern of unwed births is heavily dictated by the racial and ethnic make up of each state, as well as by educational and income levels. States such as Mississippi and Louisiana are at the top partly due to the extremely high unwed birth percentages for Blacks (77%) and Hispanics (50%). The state with the highest overall unwed birth percentage is New Mexico (51%), owing mainly to the contribution of its large Hispanic population. If one removes Blacks and Hispanics from the equation and looks just at unwed births among Whites, a geographic pattern more influenced by family traditionalism emerges. For the White population only, the unwed birth percentage in Mississippi (26%) is lower than for the White population in New Hampshire (27%). Unwed birth percentages below the national average of 25% for Whites are also found in the Red states of Alabama (21%), North Carolina (23%), and Georgia (23%). In contrast, above average unwed birth percentages for Whites are found the in secular and cohabitation-high Blue states of Vermont (32%) and Maine (35%) and Oregon (29%). (e) The picture is further complicated, however, by the fact that marriage, cohabitation, and unwed birth rates are so strongly affected by income and educational levels. In general, people with lower incomes and less education tend to marry less, cohabit more, and have more births out-of-wedlock. While professed traditional family values may help to generate fewer unwed births, they do not seem to provide much protection against divorce. The highest divorce rates are found in the more religiously-based Red states such as Arkansas (25), Oklahoma (25), and West Virginia (23), in striking contrast to more secular Blue states such as Pennsylvania (11), and Massachusetts (11). The national divorce rate was 16 divorces per 1000 married women in 2005. (f) Level of educational achievement is the single factor that probably best explains the geographic distribution of divorce. The lower the educational (and associated income) level, the higher the divorce rate, and educational levels are substantially lower in the Red states than in the Blue states. The Blue states of the West Coast stand as an exception to this education-based pattern, however, with the divorce rates for highly-educated Oregon and Washington being above the national average (probably California, too, but unfortunately divorce rates for that state are not available). In addition to education, therefore, another important causal factor in divorce may be the level of geographic mobility in a state, making the more recently settled and more transient populations of the West Coast and Mountain states more vulnerable to divorce. Mobility levels may also help to account for another geographic exception: the long-settled Red states of the Central Plains (e. g. Iowa and North Dakota) have very low divorce rates, comparable to those of the East Coast states. Footnotes: a. Calculations by the National Marriage Project obtained using data from the Current Population Surveys, March 2005 Supplement, as well as Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2005, National Vital Statistics Report 54:20, July 21, 2006, Table 3. The exceptionally high marriages rates in Nevada and Hawaii are not considered here because so many out-of-staters go to these states to get married. b. Calculations by the National Marriage Project using data downloaded from the American Community Survey, 2005. c. Fertility rates from â€Å"Births: Preliminary Data for 2005,† National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 55, No. 11, December 28, 2006. d. Ron J. Lesthaeghe and Lisa Neidert, â€Å"The Second Demographic Transition in the US: Exception or Textbook Example? ,† Population and Development Review 32:4 (December, 2006). e. Unmarried mother birth data from â€Å"Births: Preliminary Data for 2005,† National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 55, No. 11, December 28, 2006. f. Calculations by the National Marriage Project obtained using data from the Current Population Surveys, March 2005 Supplement less population in CA, GA, HI, IN, LA and MN to match unreported divorces in these states. Divorce counts from Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2005, National Vital Statistics Report 54:20, July 21, 2006, Table 3. The highest divorce rate, of course, is found in Nevada (38. ), and not considered here because of the out-of-stater problem. MARRIAGE Key Finding: Marriage trends in recent decades indicate that Americans have become less likely to marry, and the most recent data show that the marriage rate in the United States continues to decline. Of those who do marry, there has been a moderate drop since the 1970s in the percentage of couples who consider their marriages to be â₠¬Å"very happy,† but in the past decade this trend has swung in a positive direction. Americans have become less likely to marry. This is reflected in a decline of nearly 50 percent, from 1970 to 2005, in the annual number of marriages per 1000 unmarried adult women (Figure 1). Much of this decline—it is not clear just how much—results from the delaying of first marriages until older ages: the median age at first marriage went from 20 for females and 23 for males in 1960 to about 26 and 27, respectively, in 2005. Other factors accounting for the decline are the growth of unmarried cohabitation and a small decrease in the tendency of divorced persons to remarry. The decline also reflects some increase in lifelong singlehood, though the actual amount can not be known until current young and middle-aged adults pass through the life course. The percentage of adults in the population who are currently married has also diminished. Since 1960, the decline of those married among all persons age 15 and older has been 13 percentage points—and 25 points among black females (Figure 2). It should be noted that these data include both people who have never married and those who have married and then divorced. In order partially to control for a decline in married adults simply due to delayed first marriages, we have looked at changes in the percentage of persons age 35 through 44 who were married (Figure 3). Since 1960, there has been a drop of 20 percentage points for married men and 18 points for married women. (But the decline has not affected all segments of the population. See the accompanying box: The Marriage Gap. ) Marriage trends in the age range of 35 to 44 are suggestive of lifelong singlehood. In times past and still today, virtually all persons who were going to marry during their lifetimes had married by age 45. More than 90 percent of women have married eventually in every generation for which records exist, going back to the mid-1800s. By 1960, 94 percent of women then alive had been married at least once by age 45—probably an historical high point. (1) For the generation of 1995, assuming a continuation of then current marriage rates, several demographers projected that 88 percent of women and 82 percent of men would ever marry. 2) If and when these figures are recalculated for the early years of the 21st century, the percentage of women and men ever marrying will almost certainly be lower. It is important to note that the decline in marriage does not mean that people are giving up on living together with a sexual partner. On the contrary, with the incidence of unmarried cohabitation increasing rapidly, marriage is giving ground to unwed unions. Most people now live together before they marry for the first time. An even higher percentage of those divorced who subsequently remarry live together first. And a growing number of persons, both young and old, are living together with no plans for eventual marriage. There is a common belief that, although a smaller percentage of Americans are now marrying than was the case a few decades ago, those who marry have marriages of higher quality. It seems reasonable that if divorce removes poor marriages from the pool of married couples and cohabitation â€Å"trial marriages† deter some bad marriages from forming, the remaining marriages on average should be happier. The best available evidence on the topic, however, does not support these assumptions. Since 1973, the General Social Survey periodically has asked representative samples of married Americans to rate their marriages as either â€Å"very happy,† â€Å"pretty happy,† or â€Å"not too happy. â€Å"(3) As Figure 4 indicates, the percentage of both men and women saying â€Å"very happy† has declined moderately over the past 25 years. (4) This trend, however, is now heading in a positive direction. 1 Andrew J. Cherlin, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992): 10; Michael R. Haines, â€Å"Long-Term Marriage Patterns in the United States from Colonial Times to the Present,† The History of the Family 1-1 (1996): 15-39. 2 Robert Schoen and Nicola Standish, â€Å"The Retrenchment of Marriage: Results from Marital Status Life Tables for the United States, 1995. † Population and Development Review 27-3 (2001): 553-563. 3 Conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, this is a nationally representative study of the English-speaking, non-institutionalized population of the United States age 18 and over. Using a different data set that compared marriages in 1980 with marriages in 1992, equated in terms of marital duration, Stacy J. Rogers and Paul Amato found similarly that the 1992 marriages had less marital interaction, more marital conflict, and more marital problems. â€Å"Is Marital Quality Declining? The Evidence from Two Generations,† Social Forces 75 (1997): 1089. THE MARRIAGE GAP There is good news a nd bad news on the marriage front. For the college-educated segment of our population, the institution of marriage appears to have gained strength in recent years. For everyone else, however, marriage continues to weaken. Thus there is a growing â€Å"marriage gap† in America, between those who are well educated and those who are not. Recent data indicates that, for the college educated, the institution of marriage may actually have strengthened. It once was the case that college-educated women married at a lower rate than their less educated peers. Indeed, marriage rates for college-educated women were lower well into the late 20th Century. Since around 1980, however, this situation has reversed. College-educated women are now marrying at a higher rate than their peers. Not only that, but the divorce rate among these women is relatively low and has been dropping. This may be due partly to the fact that college-educated women, once the leaders of the divorce revolution, now hold a more restrictive view of divorce than less well educated women. b The out-of-wedlock childbearing of college-educated women has always been well below that of other segments of the population. Now, among those who delay marriage past age 30, this is the only group becoming more likely to have children after marriage rather than before. c There is more good news. The marriages of the college educated have become more egalitarian than ever, both in the sense that husbands and wives are matched more equally in their educational and economic backgrounds, and that they hold more egalitarian attitudes about marital gender roles. d As icing on the cake, all of this may add up to greater marital happiness. The percentage of spouses among this group who rate their marriage as â€Å"very happy† has held fairly steady over recent decades, whereas for other parts of the population the percentage has dropped significantly. In large numbers, therefore, the college educated part of America is living the American dream—with happy, stable, two-parent families. There is one problem, however, and it is a serious one for the future of the nation. College-educated women aren’t having enough children to replace themselves. In 2004, for example, twenty four percent of women 40 to 44 years old with a bachelor’s degree were childless, com pared to only fifteen percent of those without a high school degree. f For the non college-educated population, unfortunately, the marriage situation remains gloomy. Marriage rates are continuing to decline, and the percentage of out-of-wedlock births is rising. In the year 2000, fully forty percent of high-school drop-out mothers were living without husbands, compared with just twelve percent of college-grad mothers. g Because of the many statistically well-documented benefits of marriage in such areas as income, health, and longevity, this gap is generating a society of greater inequality. America is becoming a nation divided not only by educational and income levels, but by unequal family structures. a Joshua R. Goldstein and Catherine T. Kenney, â€Å"Marriage Delayed or Marriage Foregone? New Cohort Forecasts of First Marriages for U. S. Women,† American Sociological Review 66-4 (2001): 506-519. b Steven P. Martin and Sangeeta Parashar, â€Å"Women’s Changing Attitudes Toward Divorce: 1974-2002: Evidence for an Educational Crossover,† Journal of Marriage and Family 68-1 (2006): 29-40. c Steven P. Martin, â€Å"Reassessing Delayed and Forgone Marriage in the United States,† unpublished manuscript (2004), Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD. Robert Schoen and Yen-Hsin Alice Cheng, â€Å"Partner Choice and the Differential Retreat from Marriage,† Journal of Marriage Family 68-1 (2006): 1-10; Arland Thornton and Linda Young-DeMarco, â€Å"Four Decades of Trends in Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United States: the 1960s Through the 1990s,† Journal of Marriage and Family 63-4 (2001): 1009-1037. e Calculation by the Na tional Marriage Project of data from The General Social Survey, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. f Jane Lawler Dye, Fertility of American Women: June 2004, Current Population Report, P20-555, Washington, DC: U. S. Census Bureau (2005): Table 7. g David T. Ellwood and Christopher Jencks, â€Å"The Uneven Spread of Single-Parent Families,† in Kathryn M. Neckerman (ed. ) Social Inequality (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), 3-77. |   | |Figure 1. Number of Marriages per 1,000 Unmarried Women Age 15 and Older, by Year, United States (a) | | |Year |Number | | | |1960 |73. |(b) | | |1970 |76. 5 | | | |1975 |66. 9 | | | |1980 |61. 4 | | | |1985 |56. | | | |1990 |54. 5 | | | |1995 |50. 8 | | | |2000 |46. 5 | | | |2005 |40. | | |a We have used the number of marriages per 1,000 unmarried women age 15 and older, rather than the Crude Marriage Rate of | |marriages per 1,000 population to help avoid the problem of compositional changes in the population, that is, changes which stem| |merely from there being more or less people in the marriageable ages. Even this more refined measure is somewhat susceptible to | |compositional changes. |b Per 1,000 unmarried women age 14 and older. | |S ource: U. S. Department of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001, Page 87, Table 117; and Statistical | |Abstract of the United States, 1986, Page 79, Table 124. Figure for 2004 was obtained using data from the Current Population | |Surveys, March 2004 Supplement, as well as Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2005, National Vital | |Statistics Report 54:20, July 21, 2006, Table 3. http://www. cdc. gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_20. pdf) The CPS, March | |Supplement, is based on a sample of the U. S. population, rather than an actual count such as those available from the decennial | |census. See sampling and weighting notes at http://www. bls. census. gov:80/cps/ads/2002/ssampwgt. htm | |Figure 2. Percentage of All Persons Age 15 and Older Who Were Married, by Sex and Race, 1960-2005 United Statesa | | |Total Males |Black Males |White Males |Total Females |Black Females |White Females | | | | | | | | | |1960 |69. 3 |60. 9 |70. 2 |65. 9 |59. 8 |66. 6 | |1970 |66. 7 |56. 9 |68. |61. 9 |54. 1 |62. 8 | |1980 |63. 2 |48. 8 |65. 0 |58. 9 |44. 6 |60. 7 | |1990 |60. 7 |45. 1 |62. 8 |56. 9 |40. 2 |59. 1 | |2000 |57. 9 |42. 8 |60. 0 |54. 7 |36. 2 |57. 4 | |2006 |56. 3 |40. 9 |58. 5 |53. |34. 3 |56. 3 | |a Includes races other than Black and White. | |b In 2003, the U. S. Census Bureau expanded its racial categories to permit respondents to identify themselves as belonging to more than | |one race. This means that racial data computations beginning in 2004 may not be strictly comparable to those of prior years. | |Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P20-506; America's Families and Living Arrangements: March 2000 and| |earlier reports; and data calculate d from the Current Population Surveys, March 2006 Supplement. | |Figure 3. Percentage of Persons Age 35 through 44 Who Were Married by Sex, 1960-2005, United States | | | | | | | |Year |Males |Females | | |1960 |88. 0 |87. | | |1970 |89. 3 |86. 9 | | |1980 |84. 2 |81. 4 | | |1990 |74. 1 |73. 0 | | |2000 |69. 0 |71. | | |2006 |67. 9 |69. 5 | |Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961, Page 34, Table 27; Statistical Abstract of | |the United States, 1971, Page 32, Table 38; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1981, Page 38, Table 49; and U. S. Bureau | |of the Census, General Population Characteristics, 1990, Page 45, Table 34; and Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001,| |Page 48, Table 51; internet tables (http://www. ensus. gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2005/tabA1-all. pdf) and data calculated | |from the Current Population Surveys, March 2006 Supplement. Figure for 2006 was obtained using data from the Current Population | |Surveys rather than data from the census. The C PS, March Supplement, is based on a sample of the U. S. population, rather than an| |actual count such as those available from the decennial census. See sampling and weighting notes at | |http://www. bls. ensus. gov:80/cps/ads/2002/ssampwgt. htm | |Figure 4. Percentage of Married Persons Age 18 and Older Who Said Their Marriages Were â€Å"Very Happy,† by Period, United States | | | | | |Period |Men |Women | |1973-1976 |69. |68. 6 | |1977-1981 |68. 3 |64. 2 | |1982-1986 |62. 9 |61. 7 | |1987-1991 |66. 4 |59. | |1993-1996 |63. 2 |59. 7 | |1998-2004 |64. 4 |60. 4 | |Source: The General Social Survey, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. The trend for| |both men and women is statistically significant (p

In a Dark Time by Theodore Roethke Essay

In the first stanza of the poem â€Å"In a Dark Time†, the reader gets the sense that not only is the author describing himself using â€Å"dark† visuals including â€Å"shadow† and â€Å"shade†, but that he is using natural scenery as well in order to set the audience up for the rest of the poem. The same line that contains those visuals also would seem to impart a certain time of day, dusk. This could also be thought of as a way for the reader to get a sense of where the author is at, reflecting on his own mind. This idea is furthered by the statements of â€Å"meeting his (own) shadow†, and when he hears his own shadow. The second stanza really goes into a faster pace, as the author begins to describe to the reader his inner feelings. By questioning his own definition of madness, and going into despair, he shows the reader that part of his mind is very confused, yet he knows that he is in the middle of whatever is going on. Again he questions, is his place in the â€Å"rocks† a cave or path, and he states that â€Å"The edge is what I have. † which seems like a way for him to again be in the middle of his situation. The third stanza continues with the natural descriptions of being outside in a natural setting during the night, or perhaps during an eclipse. Again, this could be just another way for the author to let his audience know what frame of mind his is in. Referring to the title of the poem, â€Å"In a Dark Time†, it would make sense that this writing is coming from the author during a time in his life in which he was questioning himself. This line of thinking continues to be the main point as he goes on to say, â€Å"A man goes far to find out what he is -, Death of the self in a long, tearless night,†. Whatever has happened to the author, he is unsure of himself and the changes that are occurring in his life at that moment. In the fourth stanza, he still proclaims how confused he his with himself, by the statement â€Å"Which I is I? † The reader is left to contemplate where the author’s sense of self lies. The last three lines seem to show that the author has decided to have his mind come together and be one with itself, which leaves the author to be â€Å"free in the tearing wind. †

A Study on the Supply and Demand for Hatchimals

A Study on the Supply and Demand for Hatchimals Supply and Demand: The Case for Hatchimals â€Å"Supply and demand† are two of the most well-known words in the subject of economics. Simply put, â€Å"supply† is the amount of something that is available, or can be made available, to consumers. â€Å"Demand† is how much consumers want or need a product. When there is more supply than demand, prices drop to get consumers to purchase the excess supply. When there is more demand for something than there is supply available, prices increase. There are two reasons for this – one, there could be a shortage of the product, and the retailer will likely need to pay a lot to re-stock it; and/or two, the retailer can simply increase their profit margins by increasing the price, as people are willing to pay for it. On the flip side, if the price of the product increases too much, demand will decrease, which will once again put the supply and demand at an equilibrium (Rittenberg Tregarthen, 2009). A popular time of year where we often see supply and demand come into play is the holiday season, starting with Black Friday and continuing all the way through after-Christmas gift returns and exchanges until approximately New Year’s Eve. Every year, there seems to be some new â€Å"must have† item. Often, it’s a toy. Kids learn about it at school or from television, they talk about it with their friends, and then they pressure their parents into getting it for them. (Sometimes, the parents can be just as guilty as the kids when it comes to consumerism, however – a parent might decide that their child must keep up with the Joneses, and have the latest and greatest toy or electronic device.) This sends the parents into a tizzy trying to track down the item in time for the holidays, while thousands – if not millions – of other parents around the country are doing the same thing. Consequently, the demand for this product becomes very high, and as stores begin to sell out frequently, the supply is very low. We saw an example of this recently, in December of 2016, when the phenomenon of â€Å"Hatchimals† began to make its’ way across North America – and even some other parts of the world! â€Å"Hatchimals† are furry, robotic, interactive animals that hatch from an egg that the owner must rub to facilitate the hatching process. Additionally, the creatures continue to â€Å"grow up† and increase in size as time passes. These are truly revolutionary in the world of children’s toys, and as such they come with quite a revolutionary price tag at approximately $60 each! That didn’t stop many parents from hunting this toy down and snatching it up – but many opportunists began finding and buying Hatchimals in bulk, and turning around to sell them on sites such as eBay for triple the price. Elasticity began to come into play here, as many parents were not willing to pay the inflated prices for the toy, and consequently stopped searching for them altogether. The after-market demand from sites like eBay and Amazon decreased greatly as a result; However, the demand to buy the toy at retail-value from stores like Target and Walmart remained on t he rise (Peachman, 2016). Spin Master, the creator of the Hatchimal toy, claimed that they knew the toy would be popular – especially around the holidays. They produced extra Hatchimals to meet this expected demand. However, they stated that they didn’t expect the response to be so overwhelming, and consequently, they struggled to keep up with consumer demand. Business cost increased for Spin Master, as they had to use airfreight to rush deliver the remaining Hatchimals from China so that they could be distributed to retail stores before the Christmas holiday. While part of the reason for the increased demand was sensationalism, there was another issue: the toy was appealing to a demographic larger than Spin Master anticipated. They had assumed the toy would appeal to children in the 5-10 year-old range, but once Hatchimals hit the market, the appeal stretched from children 3-12 years old (Peachman, 2016). The demand and price point of these toys did not seem to deter most parents from at least trying to obtain one for their child, however. This is where consumer choice and opportunity cost came into play. Some parents chose to forgo the hassle of driving hundreds of miles collectively, checking all of the stores within a certain radius, in exchange for paying three times the price on a second-hand retailer website, such as eBay. Other parents refused to pay that high of a price point in exchange for continuing to fight for the toy at big-box stores, and the article I chose even talks about a group of parents standing outside of the Target store entrance for several hours in the 20 degree cold weather in order to obtain one on delivery day. Some parents took a chance and entered raffles for the Hatchimals on Facebook by pitching in $10 with approximately a dozen other parents. Most were unsuccessful (Peachman, 2016). Fast forward to Christmas season, 2017: Hatchimals were a word barely uttered, and now, most children approaching five or six years of age would likely only have a vague idea of what I was talking about if I asked them if they like Hatchimals. The craze has worn off, and the supply of Hatchimals seems to have reached an equilibrium with the price point – most are retailing for between $45 and $50 at Target, Walmart and online. By the time the holiday season rolls around again this year, this entire process will repeat with a new â€Å"must have† item.

Romantic Era Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Romantic Era - Essay Example A number of European society’s aspects transformed the romantic era in different ways. For instance, in romantics â€Å"nature† meant many things. It was perceived as a source of image and subject, as healing power, as an artificial form of civilization (Geoffrey, 2004). Romanticism gave a lot of emphasis in accurate description of natural phenomena and capturing of â€Å"sensuous nuance† which was a true representation of romantic landscape. Other aspects of European society that transformed the romantic era included symbolism and myth. Symbols borrowed from the European society in romanticism were viewed as human artistic correlatives of emblematic language in nature (Hye-Kyung, 2005). They were given a lot of value and attention, since they could suggest many things simultaneously. One can say that the myths were partly used because of the desire to communicate â€Å"inexpressible† by use of the readily available language resources. During this period, people’s love for nature and imagination had prospered, flourished and skyrocketed. The main tenets of romanticism included individualism, emotionalism, and nature. These three main qualities are visible repeatedly in a number of very important and lasting artists, authors, musicians, and so forth. In romantic art and literature, nature was portrayed in a romantic manner. For instance, in artistic paintings such as the kindred spirits done by Asher Durand nature is portrayed alongside friendship between two men (Irving, 2004). In the painting, the two men stand on top of a cliff surrounded by very beautiful scenery. Use of light in the painting makes it to appear somehow hazy but well illuminated. Use of lush and green trees in a mountainous background creates an emphasis of simple, pure beauty of nature. Emotionalism is another tenet deeply shown in romantic literature. The romantics had a common belief that opening one-self or â€Å"using

College Algebra Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words - 1

College Algebra - Assignment Example This is due to human error associated with the way in which I measured the object. There are a couple sources of error that could have lead to this high level of experimental error. The first is the way in which the measurement was taken. By not keeping consistent when measuring, there will be a certain degree of error. Although it was easy to measure the diameter due to its linear nature, the circumference is probably where the majority of the measuring error occurred. This is because it has a curve which is hard to measure when using something linear such as a ruler because it becomes more of a measure of multiple tangent points rather than the actual circumference. In measuring and scientific studies, human error always plays a part in the error of science and mathematics. There are multiple skills that I have learned here which can help in my life. The first is to understanding the difference between precision and accuracy. In life, sometimes it is important to be consistent in your results rather than being accurate all of the time. Being aware of your biases and your tendencies in mathematics such as rounding and measurements are important, especially when dealing with aspects of business and finance. The value is probably more accurate in the assignment where we drew polygons inscribed into the circle. This is because on the polar graph paper, the straight lines were made in relation to the angles created at the intersecting points. Plus, the lines are all tangent to the circle which we use in calculus in order to find the values of curves, rather than as in algebra we find measurements using lines. The best approximation for inscribing the polygon was once a polygon with 36 sides was inscribed within the circle. This allowed for the most accurate measurement with only a variability of 10 degrees at each corner intersection point. When you divide the

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5th Hour - Essay Example It was appealing to learn that Teach for America aims at solving educational problems associated with population diversity. The organization would provide efficient pathways to leadership and service to all citizens within America. Matt Kramer presented Team for America objectives and mandate with zeal and authority. I liked his oratory skills. He talked fluently and vividly throughout the session. His transformative skills depicted the breed of leaders Team for America purposes to develop. He coordinated his activities with ease and involved all existing members of Team for America in his decisions. I appreciated the recruiting process Team for America adopted. The organization recruiting process seemed transparent and accommodative. The organizations’ teachers would consist of individuals from different cultures. Team for America would engage recent college graduates and other professionals in teaching programs for a minimum of two years. Recruits would teach various disciplines in rural and urban communities throughout America. Team for America would aim at transforming students to attain their full potential and develop into leaders that advocate educational equity. It was quite appealing to learn that Team for America teachers would receive monthly salary and benefits similar to government district salary for tutors. I learnt about the various benefits that exist for Valparaiso University graduates who will opt to join Team for America. They would explore numerous opportunities including learning and appreciating cultural diversity. Joining Team for America is a lifetime opportunity for participating in life transforming

Application of Advertising Coursework Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words

Application of Advertising - Coursework Example Though smart automobiles are manufactured in France on the special factory called Smartville the headquarter of the company is situated in Boblingen (Smart History). Smart was created as a completely innovative model and its design and production was performed in association with Swatch brand in the beginning. The main emphasis was placed on the small size of the automobiles and the subsequent comfort for drivers. The logo, the motto and the name of the brand reflect that concept. The logo consists of a letter â€Å"c† and an arrow which are interpreted as â€Å"compact† and â€Å"forward thinking†. The motto of the company sounds like â€Å"open your mind† and is addressed to free and extravagant people who are no afraid of trying something new (Lewin, 2010). There have been several variations of smart design after the original model called Smart Fortwo was launched. Now electric versions of cars and the automobiles with exclusive design as well as sport cars are available in Europe, Latin America, Australia, Asia, and North America (Smart History). Obviously the advertising campaign for such an extraordinary product had to be absolutely creative. The first and the most noticeable thing that Smart manufactures managed to do was to give a product a personality that set it apart from all the other competitors. Smart car appeared as a pretty, witty, and a compact accessory and did not resemble a car in its general sense. Most people got used to the fact that to feel safe and respectable they have to drive big monochrome automobiles produced in Germany which is famous as the motherland of best cars. Smart has broken the standards - it started manufacturing cars that looked like they could fit into woman`s purse (that is another reason why smart cars are appreciated by women). Nevertheless, the status of the consumer did not decrease – it is not a compromise between more expensive and less expensive car-

Economics for Business Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words - 1

Economics for Business - Essay Example (Monaghan, 2014) UK’s car market is the second largest market in Europe after Germany and therefore has a critical significance in terms of its contribution to the market. The market is however, dominated by the few but very large players in the industry. 2013 figures suggest that Ford emerged as one of the leading players in the market followed by Vauxhall and BMW. These brands are considered as the hottest selling brands with Ford Fiestas as the leading vehicle in the country purchased during 2013. Since the market is rebounding from its earlier levels, there are signs of price wars in the industry as one of the largest suppliers in the market i.e. Ford has started a fierce competition with the existing players in the market. It is also because of this reason that Ford Fiesta has registered highest number of growth in terms of units sold during 2013. Ford has been specifically offering deep discounts to the dealers on selling certain number of cars of its brands during the month. It suggests that Ford has been capitalizing on the growing opportunities and leveraging the same through the stronger incentives to the dealers. Other players such as Daewoo and Hyundai are also believed to be working towards matching such offers at EU wide level thus initiating price wars at the regional level. (News.bbc.co.uk, 2014) A closer analysis of the market would suggest that the market is being dominated by few but relative larger players in the market. UK Car market is dominated by both the local as well as international players. Local firms such as Vauxhall are also considered as the major players with firms like Ford, Nisan as well as Daewoo and Hyundai are also continuing to dominate the market. What is however, critical to note that none of these firms are actually the price makers as the overall demand depends upon certain other related factors such as availability of cheaper consumer credit and overall economic

Variable Overhead Variance Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Variable Overhead Variance - Essay Example As earlier explained, the possible causes for these adverse variable manufacturing overhead variance is over utilization of the machine hours than what was budgeted that it negates even the favorable effects of lower expenditure for such manufacture. In order to reduce the cost of expenditure for the manufacturing purposes, some direct materials are sourced from local sources which may not be of standard quality thereby increasing the time spent on machine hours to match the required sandal design specifications. Hence, the management needs to check in for quality of the raw material purchased rather than only going by price considerations so that the overall cost of manufacturing overhead reduced and even the quality of the finished product would be even better than what is marketed now. It is observed that the raw material purchases are below the budgeted standards thereby raising doubts on the quality of the raw material procured and as such, work on them becomes tedious and more time consuming in terms of machine hours. Care should be taken while selecting the right type of raw material so that in the coming months, there is no occurrence of

Rites of Passage Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Rites of Passage - Research Paper Example This gives him the energy and spirit to enter the next stage with valor and delight. The theme behind is that such rites help us stay connected to our natural events of life or life cycle. A person is able to go through a happy flashback of his life when he thinks in old age how cheerfully he entered each stage and coped with the hardships that come with every phase. This paper intends to compare and contrast the rites of passage in modern American and Indian cultures. Modern American society celebrates many rites of passage, like baby showers, bar mitzvahs, quinceaneras, and school graduations. There are very few definite events that mark a person’s shift from adolescence into adulthood. We see an absence of clearly defined rites of passage in the contemporary culture, which have prevailed in olden times in America. Indian culture also does not have very clearly defined rites of passage except some important ones like birth, marriage and funeral. However, there are some simil arities that both cultures share, for example grief is symbolized with color. American society relates black with grief and Indians link white with sadness. For example, on funerals, Americans wear black and Indians wear white. There are more differences in the carrying out of the rites of passage than similarities, in the two cultures. ... The expectant mother is dressed in a heavy dress with a lot of garlands. Elderly ladies shower blessings on her, and women share tips and tricks of mothering a child. The home deity is worshipped. The mother is given the gifts which are meant for her and not the baby. American culture celebrates adolescence ceremonies both for boys and girls, to honor their stepping into puberty. The most prominent adolescent rite of passage celebrated in America is the quincearena. Quinceanera celebrates a girl’s fifteenth birthday thus commemorating her past fifteen years into a get-together where people related to her make merry and congratulate her for her coming adulthood (Alvarez). Her journey from childhood to adulthood is recollected and she transforms from a naughty little kid into a delicate, pretty lady. The invited families are encouraged to select the customs that have special meaning to them and to add to the customs as they wish. That is what makes the celebration unique and ver y special. In contrast, in Indian culture, there is no such ceremony that celebrates the passing of fifteen years or steeping of a girl or boy into the sixteenth year of life. American practices have more or less become dependent on the economical and psychological aspects of life. For example, funeral practices in America depict true picture of capitalism and materialism. Corpse is displayed in the public for last viewing. This is a general acceptance of the fact that death is expected of all human beings and none of us resist to it. Corpses, nowadays, are prepared with makeup and expensive clothes before burial. Memorial services and cremations are also in practice. Hence, American funeral is an organized and

Federal Republic Essay Example for Free

Federal Republic Essay First , there was a â€Å" Indias Ninth Five-Year Plan† projects generation of 54 million new jobs during the Plan period (1997-2002). But performance has always fallen short of target in the past, and few believe that the current Plan will be able to meet its target. The Indian youth also get problems in finding job: â€Å" If the unemployment rate observed during 1993-94 continues, the number of unemployed youth in terms of usual status was of 6. 2 million in 2001 . † ( Pravin Visaria 2000:n. p. ) Indias labor force is growing at a rate of 2. 5 percent annually, but employment is growing at only 2. 3 per cent. Thus, the country is faced with the challenge of not only absorbing new entrants to the job market (estimated at seven million people every year), but also clearing the backlog. Sixty percent of Indias workforce is self-employed, many of whom remain very poor. Nearly 30 per cent are casual workers (i. e. they work only when they are able to get jobs and remain unpaid for the rest of the days). Only about 10 per cent are regular employees, of which two-fifths are employed by the public sector. Now, the Indian economy starts recovering but the it’s hard to say that unemployment will be eliminated soon. In the table below the expected level of employment till 2012 is given(which is a very low one). Population and Labour Force: 1997 – 2012 (million 1st April) 1997 2002 2007 2012 Population 951. 18 1028. 93 1112. 86 1196. 41 Labor Force 397. 22 449. 62 507. 94 562. 91 The growing unemployment in India caused a lot of trouble what has been worsening the economical situation since 1980s. It produces the hole in the turnover of the goods as people can’t buy the necessary quantity of products not having enough earnings. Political instability in the late 1980s and oil price shocks resulting from the Persian Gulf War (1991) led to an economic crisis in early 1991, but swift reform measures taken by the newly elected government proved highly successful. Inflation declined from 13.1% in 1991 and 1992 to 8. 6% in 1993 and 1994. However, inflation stood at 14% in 1998. So, as we see, such concern as unemployment influences a lot the whole economical picture of the country. Besides, person that is out of working can’t develop himself and that reflects in a considerable way in the demographic structure of the country. All over the world history the notion of unemployment is associated with the crisis in the economy of any country. Biblioghraphy. 1. No author. 2005. Of economies policies http://www.ilo.org

The Value of Hrm to Business Organisations Essay Example for Free

The Value of Hrm to Business Organisations Essay The value of HRM to business organisations Section 1: Literature Review The approach to the employment of people experienced a major shift from traditional personnel management towards human resource management (HRM) in 1980s, when the deflation and recession crashed into the infrastructure of employment. After that shift, the employees were more likely assumed as valuable assets and a key source of competitive advantage (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2002), and the effective management of ‘resourceful humans’ tended to be seen as a crucial approach to improve organizational performance through ‘the strategic deployment of a highly committed and capable workforce using an array of cultural, structural and personnel techniques’ (Storey, 2007, p. 7). As an integral and prominent part of HRM, the pay and reward management also has undergone many considerable changes over the past two decades driven by the shift of organizational management as mentioned above. More recently, the notion that equilibrium pay level results from Adam Smith’s â€Å"invisible hand† – market forces – can hardly explain the pay and reward system of HRM, which involves far-researching aims (Gilman, 2009). Lawler’s ‘new pay’ began to attach much importance to the understanding of the organization’s goals, values and culture and the challenges of a global economy when formulating pay strategy (Armstrong, 2002). And its model suggested that the reward strategy should consist of three key elements: the organization’s core value, structural issues and process, whose consistency would be the key factor of effectiveness of the reward system (Lawler, 1995). More frequently, the reward system is now linked to business strategy through motiving people to behave in expected ways. As Gomez-Mejia (1993, cited in Kessler, 2007) stated that the new approach to pay is more about achieving business objectives, rather than the issues of internal equity and external equity. However, the reward system as a strategic tool in practice is quite doubtful. Many studies showed the indeterminate results from such system like PRP in  terms of performance (Gilman, 2009). And Lewis (2006) also pointed out the limitations of assumptions in Lawler’s model. What’s more, the pay design is fraught with difficulties in changing people’s behavior for organizational goals. For example, the business objectives may contradict on each other in pay policy (Marchington and Wilkinson, 1998). Additionally, it was argued that the business strategy should not be primacy over internal and external equity. As Kessler (2007) suggested that the employees are more likely to feel good and act in ways to progress business objectives if they are paid fairly. And he also pointed out that business strategy and equity may be well related, rather than being alternatives. In the light of these statements, various types of payment scheme are developed such as Payment by Results, Performance Related Pay, Total Reward and Skills-based Pay. And each of them involves a range of principles like internal and external equity, working time, outcome, skills and competencies, effectiveness, experience. The combinations of different principles vary from organizational objectives, cultures and features. Thus there is unlikely to be an all-fit system for every organization. This paper will then focus on the Performance Related Pay (PRP) and the organizations with PRP system. Performance-related Pay (PRP) appears in organizations during 1980s as a result of motivating people to improve their work performance and developing a culture which performance plays a determinant role. First-generation system implemented in the 1980s did not acquire desirable results. Some organizations are carrying out second-generation system to avoid previous mistakes. Others are trying the pay relevant to competence or contribution (Armstrong, 2002). Nowadays, PRP is introduced continuously in two-thirds of organizations (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2002). ‘Performance-related Pay (PRP) provides individuals with financial rewards in the form of increases to basic pay or cash bonuses which are linked to an assessment of performance, usually in relation to agreed objectives’ (Armstrong, 2002, p. 286). According to Armstrong (2002), Performance-related Pay provides the following  potential advantages: Firstly, it incents individuals and thereby enhances personal and organizational performance. Secondly, it can be used as a lever for change. Thirdly, it conveys an idea that performance plays a significant role in general or specific fields. Also, it connects incentive programmes with the fulfillment of certain results which contribute to realize organizational goals. Additionally, it is beneficial for organization to recruit and retain people with monetary incentives. Finally, it satisfies a fundamental human need to acquire rewards for fulfillment. However, there are some problems about PRP. If employees agree about the principle and practice of PRP, then they will do better jobs and organization will acquire beneficial outcomes. Inversely, if they do not agree about either the principle or practice of PRP, they will not be motivated effectively for better work performance and organization will get bad outcomes (Lewis, 1998, cited in Marchington and Wilkinson, 2002). According to a research made by Marsden and Richardson (1994, cited in Marchington and Wilkinson, 2002), PRP may cause jealousy among employees. Unfairness exists in distribution of performance payments which is the major reason for the non-efficiency of motivation. The amount of money is also a significant element for successful introducing PRP. If it is not large enough, then it is hard to trigger a change in work performance. As Lawler (1990, cited in Marchington and Wilkinson, 2002, p. 501) suggested that variable pay less than 10 per cent of base salary would be not attractive in PRP scheme. An organization introduces and develops a PRP programme generally involving these main stages: setting objectives for rewarding employees according to their performance; analyzing the circumstances of organization, including its culture and the type of employees; determining who should be participated in line managers, team leaders, employees and trade unions; considering methods of performance appraisal; carrying out the plan and assessing its effects. PRP should be schemed and conducted with great care and organizations have to be flexible to adjust the plan timely for constantly changing environment and the feedback from staff (Armstrong,  2002). The following part will describe two organizations conducting PRP scheme. Section 2: Case Study Description In this section, two pieces of empirical researches are introduced for the further analysis in next section. The first case of Finbank is regarded as an unsuccessful case of PRP system. And the second case of NHS has been chosen for two reasons: Firstly, though NHS is not exactly a business organization, the PRP of NHS was set by commercial-oriented objectives (Bach, 1994, cited in Dowling and Richardson). Therefore NHS still bears mush resemblance of business organizations in respect of PRP. Secondly, few empirical researches showed the positive result of PRP in the four journals. Thus the case of PRP in NHS is introduced here for its commercial-oriented objectives and relatively successful results. 2.1 The case of Finbank’s reward strategy for managers  (Summarized from Lewis, P. (2000) Exploring Lawler’s new pay theory through the case of Finbank’s reward strategy for managers. Personnel Review, 29(1), pp. 10-32.) The article explains consequences and effectiveness of introducing PRP in Finbank, by using Lawler’s model, where Lawler argues that three principal elements of reward system – core vale, process and structure – need to be consistent for the effectiveness of the system. The interviews of managers and personnel staff were conducted to explore their views on the reasons why the bank adopted PRP, and the extent to which it was successful. Finbank introduced the new reward system with the business objectives of ‘driving up income and driving down costs’, where the incremental system never worked and any increase in salary depended on performance. This shift was expected to create a â€Å"performance culture†, while the process of implementation was more likely to result in a reduction of trust between Finbank and its managers. Consequently, PRP in Finbank was regarded as the main measure of cost control, not incentive mechanism for better performance. The research showed that the low level of communication was the one of main features in Finbank’s PRP and reduced the effectiveness of the whole system. A lack of participation and involvement in objectives setting and performance appraisal resulted in low acceptance of the new system, and low levels of openness in performance feedback and reward criteria also declined the credibility of PRP process. In conclusion, a fundamental inconsistency between the process and the values in Lawler’s model was argued for the deficiencies of PRP system. While, more limitations of a simple top-down process assumption, an assumption of causal link between reward strategy and employees’ behavior, deterministic assumption in Lawler’s model were tested by the Finbank case. 2.2 The case of PRP system for managers in the NHS  (Summarized from Dowling, B. and Richardson, R. (1997) Evaluating performance-related pay for managers in the National Health Service. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 8(3), pp. 348-366.) This paper assesses the use of PRP (performance-related pay) for NHS (National Health Service) managers and explains the limited success drawbacks in the scheme’s design and administration. In addition, some refinements and implications of the scheme are also concluded. In the first section, the author gives a brief introduction of NHS scheme. The three key elements of the scheme include the setting of objectives, the appraisal of the degree that these objectives being achieved and the increased payment linked to the assessment. As for the evaluation criterion of the scheme, the author took various factors into consideration, such as its impact on manager’s motivation. However, evaluating a single policy innovation can be rather difficult as long as the circumstances maintain uncertain. To make subjective judgments of the extent the scheme succeeds, some explanatory theoretical framework based on scheme’s three key elements is also launched, including structured interviews and questionnaires for gathering data from managers. According to the respondents, the scheme exerts limited positive effects on managers’ motivation and colleagues’ co-operation, and no evident corresponding negative consequences are indicated. The difference in the results may be explained in the following two reasons: the better implement and the mature design. The author tries to figure out why the scheme motivates only a certain group of people by examining the raw data and using formal multivariate analysis on further study of the scheme’s three elements. Considering both the qualitative and quantitative material involved, the initial examination of the raw data suggests that the three elements of the scheme have different degrees of success. Respondents were most satisfied with many of the objective-setting process elements which may result from improved motivation levels; however, respondents expressed more insistent reservations on the of the performance-judging process elements; in terms of the rewarding element, even few respondents believed the scheme’s financial provisions themselves act as an incentive. So this could be another problem of implementation which hinders the success that the scheme supposed to have. Section 3: Analysis and Conclusions 3.1 Analysis of the case of Finbank As mentioned in the section 2, the research of Finbank’s reward strategy followed the analytical structure of Lawer’s model, where the effectiveness of the reward strategy depended on the consistencies between three crucial elements: the organization’s core values, process of implementation and the structure of pay. In this section, the element of process will be focused and used as analytical framework. 3.1.1 Setting objectives In the major background of recession and deflation of the 1980s, it seems reasonable to set the business objectives as ‘driving up income and driving down costs’ in the condition where PRP was introduced to Finbank with the closure of branches and the consequent loss of jobs. According to author’s research, most managers interviewed regarded cost reduction as a major motive for the introduction of PRP, which led to reduction of trust between  the Finbank and its managers. This negative effect of PRP results from the fact that the business objectives may be contradictive on each other in pay policy (Marchington and Wilkinson, 1998). For ‘driving up income’, the bank want to create the managers behaviors and attitudes meeting with customers’ needs. Whereas for ‘driving down cost’, salary cost the major cost in the financial industry would be cut producing negative attitudes. For sure, the motivational effects of PRP were seriously restricted by the objective of cost reduction. 3.1.2 Measuring performance As Beer and Walton (1984) suggested, the acceptance could be improved by the involvement and participation in decision making and administration of reward system, but such participation was rare for the time-consuming. The research also showed the low acceptance and credibility of performance appraisal with the lack of such participation in Finbank. And the author argued that the criteria of appraisal encouraged managers to focus on â€Å"hard† financial and short-term targets rather than â€Å"soft† and long-term ones like developmental relationships with staff and customers, which managers thought were more important. It sounds reasonable, but more cautious consideration should be taken in this issue. For the â€Å"soft† performance cannot be reliably tested and easier for managers to argue. And such is human nature, that the â€Å"hard† criteria of PRP can hardly meet pleasantness of â€Å"risk-averse† employees, who were used to enjoy the securi ty and predictability of the automatic annual increase in the incremental system. 3.1.3 Performance feedback and translating performance into reward The research showed that there was little feedback on performance received by managers. Furthermore, there were no clear criteria about how to translate a certain performance into reward. These two processes have key functions in changing employees’ behaviors, where Finbank seemed to be a failure. Furthermore, a lack of openness in performance feedback process and reward criteria led to the low trust and credibility in the whole PRP process, which seriously had negative impact on the effectiveness of the system. Personally, the lack of money available to drive the PRP and the cost-control objective appeared to be the main reasons for these results. 3.1.4 Major value of PRP in Finbank PRP was a powerful symbol of â€Å"performance culture† at Finbank, which emphasized individual performance rather than the length of the service. This major shift of culture would definitely change employees’ attitudes and behaviors. Though it seems that the change was not positive and the motivational effects of PRP was a failure in this case, the PRP was still an integral and crucial part of business strategy of Finbank, which drove Finbank from poor commercial performance in 1980s to a recovery in profits in 1900s. On the credit side, PRP of Finbank indeed achieved one of the most importance objectives driving down the cost, which practically is the obvious and vital value of PRP in Finbank, though it is theoretically not the major function of PRP. 3.2 Analysis of the case of NHS The analysis from the research suggests the PRP scheme in NHS is comparatively successful. Although Marsden and Richardson (1994, cited by Dowling and Richardson, 1997) state PRP not only has positive influence, it also has many serious drawbacks; Thompson(1993, cited by Dowling and Richardson, 1997) argues PRP may demotivate employees rather than incenting them; Cannell and Wood(1992, cited by Dowling and Richardson, 1997) question the role of monetary incentives in motivation, because they believe people who work for Health Service are not for money; according to the questionnaire, 29 per cent managers motivated by the scheme and the majority of them thought they work harder than before. From this point, in my opinion, the PRP in NHS is working, but with limited effectiveness. The PRP scheme in NHS has three elements: setting objectives, judging performance and the according rewards. Goal setting plays an essential role in PRP scheme. The best objectives are challenging but reasonable with agreed deadlines, otherwise, it may challenge managers instead of motivating them. Besides, making objectives clearly and acquiring feedback and support from immediate superior also exert an impact on the effectiveness of objectiveness. While the process of goal-setting in NHS is relatively success, because the majority of mangers thought objectives fit above characteristics and enhance their motivation and work behavior. For judging performance, to a certain extent, it reduces the effectiveness of PRP in NHS. As mentioned in the material, 67 per cent managers thought it is subjective to evaluate work performance to determine the awards. It is hard to keep fairness in judgment which is from the ideas of assessors. To conduct PRP scheme, it is necessary to remain objectives in performance appraisal with agreed criteria. As mentioned in section 1, the amount of money is also an important element for successful introducing PRP. If it is not large enough, then it is hard to trigger a change in work performance. NHS managers appear to do not pay attention to this point. From the research, it can be found the monetary incentives were thought to be sardonic which was too little to act as a motivator. Probably, the limited cash environment may be a reason for it. The feeling of not reflecting personal fulfillments and subjective judgments make the rewards highly critical. After analyzing main elements of the scheme, some aspects of it should be improved by policy makers. Firstly, people challenged by their objectives may be motivated to work harder. Therefore, objectives set should make people feel reasonable. This demands managers acquire appropriate feedback and support from their immediate superiors timely. Additionally, the process of performance appraisal should be operated with fairness. Otherwise, it may destroy the sense of challenge and cut down PRP’s effectiveness of motivation. Secondly, the scheme’s financial aspects are the other important part. The scheme should make the clarity to managers of the relation between effort and rewards, which is beneficial for strengthening the reliability and predictability of PRP scheme. Thereby, it heightens the motivational and behavioral effects of PRP scheme. (2922)